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Note
One Big, Happy Family? In Search of a More
Reasoned Approach to Grandparent Visitation in
Minnesota
Catherine M. Gillman
In 1989, shortly after Wanda gave birth to her son Cody, she
pled guilty to federal drug charges and served a sentence of
three months in a halfway house.1 Cody's grandmother, Geral-
dine, took custody of him during Wanda's sentence. 2 Geraldine
returned Cody to Wanda's custody after her release, but contin-
ued to care for him while Wanda worked.3 Wanda and Cody
moved into Geraldine's home for a short time in 1992 and then
moved into a trailer owned by Geraldine. 4 Soon thereafter,
Wanda's relationship with her mother faltered, and since then
she has denied Geraldine any opportunity to see Cody.5 Geral-
dine turned to the courts to secure the right to visit with her
grandson.6
Sadly, almost one-third of all families 7 no longer fit the no-
tion of a traditional family consisting of two cohabiting married
1. Reed v. Glover, 889 S.W.2d 729, 729-30 (Ark. 1994).
2. 889 S.W.2d at 730.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. An increasing number of children live in households headed by one par-
ent. Between 1970 and 1984, the number of families headed by one parent
grew from 3.8 million (12.9% of all family groups) to more than 8.5 million
(25.7% of all family groups). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P-20,
No. 398, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1984, at 4, tbl. D
(1985) [hereinafter 1984 REPORT]. By 1993 the number of one-parent family
groups had grown to 10.9 million (30.2% of all family groups). BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P-20, No. 477, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERIS-
TICS: MARCH 1993, at XVI, tbl. G (1994) [hereinafter 1993 REPORT]. African-
American households witnessed an even more pronounced demise in the tradi-
tional family. Single-parent family groups grew from 35.7% of all African-
American family groups in 1970 to 59.2% in 1984. 1984 REPORT, supra, at 4,
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parents and their biological children (an intact family8 ). The in-
creasing instances of family turmoil threaten the psychological
health of the family's children.9 Under common law, courts
rarely ordered visitation between grandparent and grandchild
as a means of protecting the grandchild from family disrup-
tion.10 State legislatures, however, stepped in where courts
feared to tread by giving grandparents greater rights of access to
their grandchildren, originally in instances of family disruption
and more recently over the wishes of parents in an intact fam-
fly.11 Minnesota, at the forefront of this national movement, 12
enacted its own grandparent visitation statute13 in 1976.14
tbl. D. By 1993, single parents headed 63% of all African-American families.
1993 REPORT, supra, at XVI, tbl. G.
Statistics explain the reasons for the growth of single-parent families. Be-
tween 1960 and 1982, the divorce rate in the U.S. more than tripled. Katharine
T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv.
879, 881 n.7 (1984) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDY SERIES P-20, No. 380, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1982, at 4, tbl. D (1983)). In addi-
tion, as of 1992, 24% of all never-married women age 18 to 44 had borne a child,
up from 15% in 1982. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CUR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDY SERIES P-23, No. 187, How WE'RE
CHANGING: DEMOGRAPHIC STATE OF =H NATION: 1994, at 1 (1994).
8. The term "intact family" refers to a nuclear family consisting of a hus-
band, a wife, and their dependent children. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 879 n.1;
Laurence C. Nolan, Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother: But Court-Ordered
Grandparent Visitation in the Intact Family?, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 51, 52 n.6
(1993).
9. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
16 (new ed. 1979) ('The prolonged absence or death of one parent may place the
child at risk."); Elaine D. Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies
and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 295, 309-10 (1985). See also infra notes
125-126 and accompanying text (discussing a parent's death as a childhood
stressor).
10. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing the common
law's general denial of grandparent visitation rights).
11. See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text (discussing statutory visi-
tation rights for grandparents).
12. By 1977, only six states other than Minnesota had enacted grandpar-
ent visitation statutes. Phyllis C. Borzi, Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of
Grandparents: One Step Closer to the Best Interests of the Child, 26 CATH. U. L.
REv. 387, 392 (1976). By 1984, 49 states had adopted similar legislation. 2
JEFF ATImSoN, MODERN CHIT CUSTODY PRACTICE § 8.11 (1986 & Supp. 1994).
13. MINN. STAT. § 257.022 (1994).
14. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 198, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 670 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 257.022). The Statute has been in a state of flux since enactment. The
legislature amended the Statute six times, the first time one year after its en-
actment. See infra notes 53-74 and accompanying text (discussing the histori-
cal development of the Statute). On January 12, 1995, four members of the
Minnesota House of Representatives introduced a bill designed to expand
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Far from ending the discussion, however, grandparent visi-
tation legislation continues to spark heated debate in Minne-
sota15 and elsewhere 16 about whether the law should recognize
and enforce grandparent visitation rights against the wishes of
the grandchild's parents.1 7 In Minnesota, the debate currently
greatly grandparent visitation rights. MzN. H.F. 53, 79th Leg. § 257.022
(1995). See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed
amendment).
The Minnesota Court of Appeals only recently has begun to interpret the
Statute's provisions. In 1989, that court issued its first decision involving the
Statute. In re Welfare of RAN., 435 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The
frequency of litigation under the Statute, however, increased recently. Eleven
cases since RAN. cite the Statute; the court issued five of those after 1993. See
infra note 85 (citing these cases). On August 29, 1994, the Minnesota Supreme
Court assented to issue its first construction of the Statute when it agreed to
review the Minnesota Court of Appeals's decision in Olson v. Olson, 518 N.W.2d
65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, No. C7-93-2425 (Minn. Aug. 29,
1994), discussed infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
15. After 18 months of lobbying, Minnesota grandparents found a legisla-
tor to sponsor their proposal to broaden grandparent visitation rights in re-
sponse to an adverse Minnesota Court of Appeals ruling in Olson. Kurt
Chandler, Bill Would Give Grandparents Right to Visitation, STAR TRm. (Min-
neapolis), Jan. 30, 1995, at lB. State family law experts, however, question the
wisdom of greatly-expanded rights. Rhonda Hillbery, Grandparents' Rights:
Case Could Affect Others Who Want to Visit Kids Against Parents' Wishes, STAR
TRm. (Minneapolis), Oct. 24, 1994, at 1A, 5
16. Grandparent visitation generally presents a much-debated issue. See,
e.g., Edward M. Burns, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Is It Time for the Pen-
dulum to Fall?, 25 FAm. L.Q. 59 (1991) (discussing policy and legal issues inher-
ent in Illinois's grandparent visitation statute); Patricia S. Ferndndez,
Grandparent Access: A Model Statute, 6 YALE L. & PoL'y Rv. 109 (1988) (pro-
posing a model grandparent access statute); Ingulli, supra note 9, at 295-98
(advocating the reevaluation of differing state grandparent visitation statutes
pending more conclusive analysis of the benefits of grandparent visitation); Pa-
tricia A. Hintz, Comment, Grandparents' Visitation Rights Following Adoption:
Expanding Traditional Boundaries in Wisconsin, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 483 (prais-
ing recent Wisconsin legislative developments concerning the effect of adoption
on grandparent visitation); Anne M. Jackson, Comment, The Coming of Age of
Grandparent Visitation Rights, 43 Am. U. L. REv. 563 (1994) (analyzing na-
tional trends and proposing a model statute); Katrine Ames, Grandma Goes to
Court, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1991, at 67 ("Visitation rights [are] one of the most
emotional issues of the growing 'grandparents' movement.").
17. Several recent articles discuss grandparent visitation over parental ob-
jection, specifically in the context of an intact family. Nolan, supra note 8, at
64-72 (criticizing judicial intervention in intact families); Alicia C. Klyman,
Comment, Family Law-Hawk v. Hawk: Grandparent Visitation Rights-
Court Protects Parental Privacy Rights Over "Child's Best Interests", 24 MEM.
ST. U. L. REv. 413 (1994) (analyzing a judicial decision invalidating a statute
that authorized grandparent visitation in intact families); Melissa L. Moore,
Comment, King v. King: The Best Interest of the Child: A Judicial Determina-
tion for Grandparent Visitation, 20 N. Ky. L. RE. 815 (1993) (criticizing a judi-
cial decision upholding the constitutionality of visitation in intact families).
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centers on visitation disputes between a grandparent and the
related parent,18 as in the hypothetical presented above.19
Grandparents want the legislature and the courts to guarantee
their right to play an expanded role in their grandchildren's
lives.20 Parents, in contrast, want to curb judicial interference
in their families. 21 The polarized debate leaves children in the
18. This Note will use "related parent" to refer to the parent who is the
child of the petitioning grandparent. Visitation disputes between a grandpar-
ent and the related parent arise in four contexts: when the grandchild lives in
an intact family, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 575-77 (Tenn. 1993),
when the spouse of the related parent has died, e.g., Ingulli, supra note 9, at
309-12, when the biological parents divorce and the related parent retains cus-
tody, e.g., Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Wyo. 1993), and when the related
parent bears or fathers the grandchild out of wedlock, e.g., Reed v. Glover, 889
S.W.2d 729, 729-30 (Ark. 1994).
19. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. The Olson case, the court
decision providing the impetus for the current debate, involved a visitation dis-
pute between a grandmother and her divorced daughter. Olson v. Olson, 518
N.W.2d 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, No. C7-93-2425 (Minn. Aug.
29, 1994). See also infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts of Olson).
20. Grandparents seek recognition from the courts and the legislature that
the grandparent-grandchild relationship exists independently of any grandpar-
ent-parent relationship. Hillbery, supra note 15, at 5A. Minnesota grandpar-
ents found a strong ally in the legislature. The legislature has frequently
enlarged statutory grandparent visitation rights in response to perceived inequ-
ities in particular situations. See infra note 102 (highlighting the impetus for
various amendments). The voting records of legislators reflect overwhelming
support for the gradual expansion of grandparent rights. See 1 1977 JOURNAL
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: SEVENTIETH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE
579 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE] (passing amendment 123-
0); 2 1977 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE: SEVENTIETH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE
2246 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE] (passing amendment
46-6); 3 1976 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: SIxTy-NnrrH SES-
SION OF THE LEGISLATURE 4158 (1976) (passing original Statute 122-0); 4 1976
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE: SIxTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE 4951
(1976) (passing original Statute 37-3).
21. Hillbery, supra note 15, at 5A. In Minnesota, the courts, rather than
the legislature, protect the perceived interests of parents. The courts recognize
"the public policy reasons that support a denial of visitation to uphold the inde-
pendence and decision-making integrity of the... family unit." In re Welfare of
R.A.N., 435 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). Parental rights advocates
receive support from constitutional scholars advocating adherence to the tradi-
tional concept of parental autonomy. See infra notes 29-30 (defining parental
autonomy); infra notes 47-52 (discussing the constitutional requirements for
state interference with parental autonomy). They also receive support from
some psychologists who conclude that the most significant factor affecting the
value of grandparent visitation to the grandchild is the relationship between
the grandparents and parents. See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 8, at 66 n.89 (citing
Ross A. Thompson et al., Grandparents' Visitation Rights: Legalizing the Ties
that Bind, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1217, 1219 (1989)). Other psychologists con-
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middle, confused by conflicting loyalties, but still in need of sta-
ble relationships with the adults in their lives.
This Note focuses on grandparent visitation rights in Min-
nesota from the context of a dispute between a grandparent and
the related parent. Part I describes the limited scope of grand-
parent visitation rights under common law and the statutory
codification and enlargement of such rights. Part I also analyzes
the evolution of Minnesota's grandparent visitation statute and
its narrow judicial construction. Part H analyzes the Minnesota
Statute and concludes that it fails to balance thoughtfully the
competing interests of grandchildren, parents, and grandpar-
ents in the myriad of situations in which visitation disputes
arise. Part I proposes that the Minnesota Legislature amend
the Statute to define clearly the situations in which the state's
determination of the best interests of the child should outweigh
the decision of the child's parents concerning grandparent
visitation.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GRANDPARENT
VISITATION RIGHTS
A. COMMON LAw DERIVATIVE RIGHTS THEORY
A derivative rights theory shapes the common law rule gov-
erning grandparent rights relative to grandchildren. Under this
theory, a grandparent's legal status derives from and is secon-
dary to the related parent's legal status.22 Grandparents thus
may visit a grandchild only with the permission of the
grandchild's parents.23 In compelling circumstances, however,
courts allow limited exceptions to the strict common law rule.
These exceptions generally adhere to the derivative rights the-
ory by reserving for grandparents legally enforceable visitation
rights only when the related parent's access to the grandchild is
dude "family stress and conflict are emotionally damaging to children." Id. (cit-
ing various psychological studies).
22. Ferndndez, supra note 16, at 118 ("A right to association with the
[grand]child resides primarily with the parents and only secondarily with the
grandparents."). Under this theory, grandparents lose grandparental status
when their child experiences a voluntary or involuntary termination of parental
rights. Id. at 118-19. Grandparents whose child has died, however, retain their
grandparental status because the deceased child retains parental status. Id.
23. Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151 (La. 1894), stands as the seminal case
establishing that grandparents do not possess a common law right to request
visitation. Courts in otherjurisdictions follow Reiss. See, e.g., Mimkon v. Ford,
332 A-2d 199, 200-01 (N.J. 1975) (citing various cases including Reiss).
1995] 1283
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1279
impaired,2 4 such as when the related parent dies2 5 or cannot ex-
ercise parental visitation following divorce.26
Courts deny grandparents an independent visitation right
on several grounds. Courts assert that parents have only a
moral, and not legal, obligation to permit grandparent visita-
tion.27 Courts also fear that judicial enforcement of grandparent
visitation rights will irreparably divide and hinder proper pa-
rental authority.2 8 Some courts hesitate to recognize grandpar-
ent visitation rights on the grounds that parental autonomy29 is
a fundamental constitutional right.30 In addition, courts hesi-
24. As the cases cited infra notes 25-26 demonstrate, most common law
exceptions award visitation only when the related parent is not the custodial
parent. See also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 269 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501-04 (Fain.
Ct. 1966) (granting visitation to mother of mentally incompetent father).
25. Several courts granted visitation rights to grandparents who main-
tained almost daily contact with their grandchild following the death of the re-
lated parent. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430 N.E.2d 652, 653-54 (M1. App. Ct. 1981);
Boyles v. Boyles, 302 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Mll. App. Ct. 1973); Lucchesi v. Lucchesi,
71 N.E.2d 920, 920-22 (M1l. App. Ct. 1947) (upholding visitation award to par-
ents of father killed in World War H who acted as trustees of a fund their son
established for the benefit of his child).
26. Solomon v. Solomon, 49 N.E.2d 807, 807-08 (M1. App. Ct. 1943) (award-
ing visitation to grandparents whose divorced son was unable to exercise visita-
tion rights because of military assignment in distant state).
27. Reiss, 15 So. at 152. In addition, courts believe that coercive judicial
measures result in less harmonious family relationships than "ies of nature."
Id. See also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 50 ("The law, then, ought to and
generally does prefer the private ordering of interpersonal relationships over
state intrusions on them.").
28. E.g., Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724, 726 (D.C. 1962); Odell v.
Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Reiss, 15 So. at 152; Annota-
tion, Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 90 A.L.R.3D 222, 225-28 (1979 & Supp.
1994).
29. Parental autonomy, a fundamental principle of family law, dictates
that parents retain the exclusive right, within certain constraints, to raise their
children without undue influence from either the state or other individuals.
Bartlett, supra note 7, at 883-86. This legal presumption provides that parents
"have the capacity, authority, and responsibility to determine and to do what is
'good' for one's children ... [and] 'best' for the entire family." JOSEPH GOLD-
STEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CmLD 7 (1979). This legal
presumption serves a twofold purpose: it gives parents the opportunity to meet
the developmental needs of children, and it safeguards the continuing mainte-
nance of family ties. Id. at 9-10. The presumption also recognizes that states
have neither the resources nor the expertise to govern all aspects of child-rear-
ing. Id. at 11-12.
30. Theodore R. v. Loretta J., 476 N.Y.S.2d 720,721 (Faro. Ct. 1984); Hawk
v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn. 1993). Contra Herndon v. Tuhey, 857
S.W.2d 203, 208-09 (Mo. 1993). See also Burns, supra note 16, at 62-64 (dis-
cussing the constitutional requirements for state intervention); Nolan, supra
note 8, at 54-55, 70-72 (discussing Supreme Court precedent); Samuel V.
Schoonmaker m et al., Constitutional Issues Raised by Third-Party Access to
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tate to order visitation and thus subject a child to a conflict of
authority that might result in animosity between the parent and
grandparent.31
B. THE EMERGENCE OF STATUTORY RELIEF
Developments during the 1970s and 1980s caused state leg-
islatures to reconsider the wisdom of the strict common law rule
denying grandparents independent visitation rights. Mounting
political pressure from powerful grandparent groups32 and
changing family demographics3 3 created strong public interest
Children, 25 FAm. L.Q. 95, 103-07 (1991) (discussing competing federal consti-
tutional rights in parents and in the state).
Parents do not have an unlimited constitutional right "to raise their chil-
dren as they see fit, free from state interference." Schoonmaker et al., supra, at
103. States reserve a parens patriae power, stemming from their police power,
to supervise the welfare of minor children and promote their best interests.
That parens patriae power is a "legitimate interest[ I] which, in certain circum-
stances, may override parental rights." Id. at 104-05. State regulations in-
fringing on the fundamental right of parental autonomy, however, must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. Id.
31. E.g., Noll v. Noll, 98 N.Y.S.2d 938, 940 (App. Div. 1950); Common-
wealth ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. 1943); Annotation, supra
note 28, at 225. A noted group of authors advanced the same reasoning in criti-
cizing court-ordered visitation with a non-custodial parent: "Children have dif-
ficulty in relating positively to, profiting from, and maintaining the contact with
two psychological parents who are not in positive contact with each other. Loy-
alty conflicts are common and normal under such conditions and may have dev-
astating consequences by destroying the child's positive relationships to both
parents." GOLDSTEiN ET AL., supra note 9, at 38. See also id. at 116-21 (arguing
court-ordered visitation is detrimental to a child).
32. The proportion of older Americans rose steadily from 1950 to 1990.
Catherine Bostock, Survey, Does the Expansion of Grandparent Visitation
Rights Promote the Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of Grandparent Visi-
tation Laws in the Fifty States, 27 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRo s. 319, 325 (1994).
At the same time, "the older population, of which an estimated 75 to 85 percent
are grandparents, [began] retiring earlier [and] living longer." Grandparents
Rights: Preserving Generational Bonds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Services of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1991) [hereinafter Preserving Generational Bonds] (statement of Rep. Snowe).
The political power of the "senior lobby" rose in conjunction with its relative
proportion among the population. Bosteck, supra, at 325. Even Congress ac-
knowledged that "seniors are the most active lobby in this country, and when it
comes to grandparents there is no one group more united in their purpose."
Preserving Generational Bonds, supra, at 2 (statement of Rep. Downey).
33. Family structure has changed tremendously since the 1960s. During
the 1960s and 1970s, the divorce rate and the number of illegitimate births
increased dramatically at the same time family size declined. Fernindez, supra
note 16, at 115-17; Bostock, supra note 32, at 322-25. The number of one-par-
ent families almost tripled between 1970 and 1993. See supra note 7 (citing
relevant statistics).
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in the importance of a grandparent's role in a grandchild's life.3 4
This public emphasis on the importance of grandparents
spurred state legislatures to create statutory grandparent visi-
tation rights.3 5 Currently, all fifty states have enacted grand-
parent visitation legislation3 6 generally designed to "protect
relationships that are important for the welfare of children."37
A minority of state statutes merely codified the existing excep-
tions to the common law rule.3 8 In contrast, a larger number of
states recently enacted changes that abolished the derivative
34. The demographic changes renewed public interest in grandparents as
vital members of the extended family. FernAndez, supra note 16, at 115-17;
Bosteck, supra note 32, at 322-25.
35. As evidence of the pressure for a legislative response, the U.S. House of
Representatives held hearings in 1982 and 1991 to discuss grandparent visita-
tion rights and to urge states to provide legislative relief from the restrictive
common law. At the first hearing, Representative Biaggi commented that his
office was besieged with phone calls and that he expected an "avalanche" of
letters in support of the hearing. Grandparents: The Other Victims of Divorce
and Custody Disputes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Services of the
House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1982). At the second
hearing, Representative Downey noted that, in part due to the subcommittee's
work, all states responded to the demands of grandparents by enacting their
own grandparent visitation statutes. Preserving Generational Bonds, supra
note 32, at 2.
36. 2 ATKINSON, supra note 12, § 8.11; Richard S. Victor et al., Statutory
Review of Third-Party Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Support, 25
FAm. L.Q. 19, 26-51 (1991) (listing the pertinent state statutes). The District of
Columbia has not enacted a third-party visitation statute.
37. Bostock, supra note 32, at 321. See also Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087,
1091 (Wyo. 1993) (discussing the "four 'symbolic' roles that help explain the
ways in which grandparents influence their families" (quoting Ferndndez,
supra note 16, at 109-10)); 2 ATia sON, supra note 12, § 8.12 (MThe rationale
most often expressed in support of grandparent visitation is that a child's con-
tact with grandparents will enrich the child's life and give the child the love and
security of an extended family."); Bostock, supra note 32, at 323-25 (discussing
the evolution of the popular idea that grandparent involvement in the nuclear
family benefits grandchildren).
38. Burns, supra note 16, at 62. For example, Minnesota's original Statute
provided for grandparent visitation only where the spouse of the related parent
held primary custody of the grandchild, due to the death or divorce of the re-
lated parent. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 198, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 670 (codified at
MJN. STAT. § 257.022(1)-(2)). See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text
(discussing the provisions of original Statute). The original Statute parallelled
the common law grant of visitation rights when the related parent could not
exercise parental visitation rights. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying
text (discussing common law grants of visitation under derivative rights
theory).
Fourteen states still condition visitation rights at least partially on the
grandparent's relationship to the custodial parent. Bostock, supra note 32, at
342. In these states, courts routinely deny visitation when the related parent
objects. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 1994) (limiting visitation
rights to parents of noncustodial parents); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 603 N.E.2d
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nature of grandparent rights, giving grandparents an independ-
ent visitation right enforceable over the objection of the related
parent.3 9
Whereas courts recognize few common law exceptions to pa-
rental autonomy,40 courts often take the legislative creation of
grandparent visitation rights as a license to construe the stat-
utes more liberally than their language explicitly requires. 41
Courts justify their broad constructions by arguing that such in-
terpretations promote the best interests of grandchildren 42 and
864, 865-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa
1984); In re Marriage of Woodley, 474 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
39. Bostock, supra note 32, at 341-46 (citing 21 state statutes that do not
contain language restricting the class of grandparents who may petition for vis-
itation). E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1993) ("The grandparents
of an unmarried minor must be granted reasonable visitation rights.., by the
district court upon application... unless a finding is made that visitation is not
in the best interests of the minor. Visitation rights ... are presumed to be in
the best interest of the minor."); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-4-52 (1992) ("The
circuit court may grant grandparents reasonable rights of visitation with their
grandchild, with or without petition by the grandparents, if it is in the best
interests of the grandchild."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993) ("Upon
petition by a grandparent,.., the court may grant reasonable visitation rights
to that person if the parents have notice of the hearing and if the court deter-
mines that visitation is in the best interest of the child."). The majority of state
courts that addressed the issue upheld the constitutionality of these broad stat-
utes. See infra note 50 (citing cases sustaining grandparent visitation
statutes).
40. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
exceptions to the common law rule denying grandparents independent visita-
tion rights).
41. See, e.g., A.F. v. B.F.O., 760 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (up-
holding standing because the statute did not specifically limit it); Goff v. Goff,
844 P.2d 1087, 1089-90 (Wyo. 1993) (same). But see Van Cleve v. Hemminger,
415 N.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (limiting the state's broad statute
by requiring an "action affecting the family" before grandparents may petition
for visitation).
42. E.g., Roberts v. Ward, 493 A2d 478, 481 (N.H. 1985) ("It makes little
sense to consider the child's interest by according grandparents visitation
rights ... when a two-parent family dissolves, but to withhold such rights in a
case... where a traditional two-parent family has never existed."); Weichman
v. Weichman, 184 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Wis. 1971) (reasoning that, in tumultuous
times, parents may put their own concerns ahead of their child's welfare and
therefore implying the necessity ofjudicial interference to safeguard the child's
best interests); Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (ruling that court-ordered grandparent
visitation is in the grandchild's best interests, even when awarded against the
parent's objection). In family law proceedings, the primary goal of courts and
legislatures long has been to secure the best interests of the child. State ex rel.
Flint v. Flint, 65 N.W. 272, 272-73 (Minn. 1895); In re Welfare of R-.N., 435
N.W.2d 71,73 (Min. Ct. App. 1989); Roberts, 493 A.2d at 481; Goff, 844 P.2d at
1090.
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remove arbitrary limits on visitation.48 Courts also proffer con-
clusory justifications for broadening grandparent visitation
rights. For example, some courts believe that grandparent visi-
tation eases a child's emotional transition during times of family
upheaval. 44 Courts also declare that heredity binds grandpar-
ents to their grandchildren, suggesting continued contact be-
tween them will be beneficial. 45 Finally, the courts cite the
erosion of the nuclear family to justify state intervention. 46
Some commentators argue that broad statutes, particularly
statutes that authorize visitation over the objection of married
parents in an intact family, unconstitutionally infringe on the
rights of parents to control a third party's access to their child.
47
These commentators urge states to enact statutes that require
Courts emphasize that they protect the right of the grandchild to know the
grandparents, not the right of the grandparents to visit the child. Lucchesi v.
Lucchesi, 71 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1947); Roberts, 493 A.2d at 481.
It would be shortsighted indeed, for this court not to recognize the real-
ities and complexities of modern family life, by holding today that a
child has no rights, over the objection of a parent, to maintain a close
extra-parental relationship which has formed in the absence of a nu-
clear family.
Roberts, 493 A.2d at 481.
43. Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091-92. The relationship between the grandparent
and grandchild, and the emotional implications of such a relationship, are
likely to be the same regardless of the marital status of the parent. Id. at 1091.
44. Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204-05 (N.J. 1975); In re Bomgardener,
711 P.2d 92, 97 (Okla. 1985); Goff, 844 P.2d at 1091 (quoting Ferndndez, supra
note 16, at 109-10).
45. Mimkon, 332 A.2d at 204 ("[V]isits with a grandparent are often a pre-
cious part of a child's experience."). See also King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632
(Ky.) ("There is no reason a petty dispute between a father and a son should be
allowed to deprive a grandparent and grandchild of the unique relationship
that ordinarily exists between those individuals."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378
(1992); Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
46. E.g., Roberts, 493 A.2d at 481. The common law's protection of paren-
tal autonomy relied heavily on the existence of a nuclear family. "The family
has been seen as the 'basic building block' of society.... The realities of modern
living, however, demonstrate that the validity of according almost absolute ju-
dicial deference to parental rights has become less compelling as the foundation
upon which they are premised, the traditional nuclear family, has eroded." Id.
(quoting Bartlett, supra note 7, at 879-80, 887-90).
47. E.g., Schoonmaker et al., supra note 30, at 113 ("A number of broad
visitation statutes appear to have broken through a constitutional barrier in an
attempt to confer state perceived benefits."). The Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes, and denied
certiorari in two recent cases. King, 828 S.W.2d at 630-33 (upholding validity
of state's grandparent visitation statute which authorizes visitation over the
objection of married, biological parents of the grandchild); In re C.G.F., 483
N.W.2d 803, 804-07 (Wis.) (upholding grant of visitation to parents of deceased
father when natural mother remarried and stepfather adopted grandchild),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
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courts to find that the deprivation of grandparent visitation suf-
ficiently harms the child to warrant state intervention, 48 before
considering whether awarding visitation will be in the best in-
terests of the child.49 That two-step test parallels the constitu-
tional requirements for state intervention in other areas of
family life.50 For example, a state may intervene once it shows
that a minor child is subject to demonstrable physical or emo-
tional harm.51 Absent identifiable harm, however, the state
may not intervene to provide a benefit.5
2
C. THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S STATUTE
Minnesota followed the strict common law rule adopted in
other states, which generally denies grandparents an independ-
48. According to one such commentator:
[There is] pressure... to use the legal system to meet every situation
in which a child needs help. We [have] to remind ourselves that
neither law, nor medicine, nor science has magical powers and that
there is no societal consensus about what is "best" or even "good" for all
children.
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 133.
49. E.g., Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Re-
fuse?, 24 J. FAm. L. 393, 394-95, 407-13 (1985-86); Nolan, supra note 8, at 59-
60; 59 AM. Jur. 2D Parent and Child § 11 (1987 & Supp. 1994). Cf GOLDSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 29, at 4-5 (expressing a preference for minimum state inter-
vention but noting that the best interests of the child must control once inter-
vention is justified). For a discussion of the state's parens patriae power, see
supra note 30.
50. See supra note 30 (discussing the constitutional standards applied to
state action that interferes with parental rights). In a case decided under the
right to privacy protected by the Tennessee constitution, the state supreme
court held "without a substantial danger of harm to the child, a court may not
constitutionally impose its own subjective notions of the 'best interests of the
child' when an intact, nuclear family with fit, married parents is involved."
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993) (finding that Tennessee's
broad grandparent visitation statute violated the state's constitution). The
court later opined that the same standard applied under federal cases. Id. at
580. See also King, 828 S.W.2d at 633-34 (Lambert, J., dissenting) (arguing the
state grandparent visitation statute unconstitutionally infringes on constitu-
tional right of parental autonomy); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 211-12
(Mo. 1993) (Covington, J., dissenting) (same). Most other courts disagree and
hold that a state-ordered grant of grandparent visitation rights does not uncon-
stitutionally infringe on parental rights. Spradling v. Harris, 778 P.2d 365, 367
(Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting the argument that the state's statute violated a
parent's fundamental right to privacy); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209 (reasoning
that the state's grandparent visitation statute contemplates "less than substan-
tial encroachment on a family"); R.T. v. J.E., 650 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. Super. Ct.
CIL Div. 1994) ("[Ihe New Jersey statute is rationally related to the legitimate
interest.., in promoting grandparent-grandchild relationships.").
51. Schoonmaker et al., supra note 30, at 105-06.
52. Id.
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ent legal right to visit with a grandchild.53 In 1974, however,
the Minnesota Supreme Court called for the state legislature to
join the emerging trend and statutorily abrogate the harsh com-
mon law rule. In the case In re Niskanen,54 the Minnesota
Supreme Court denied a grandmother's request for visitation
with her two grandchildren after they were adopted by their re-
spective foster parents. 55 Reluctantly concurring in the court's
decision, Justice Yetka wrote that "[glrandparents sometimes
are as much attached to their grandchildren as to their own chil-
dren.".56 Building on this belief, he emphasized the inadequacies
of the common law and called for legislative relief: "I find the
end result of [our] decision, which will have the practical effect
of denying to a maternal grandparent all contact with her
grandchildren, almost barbaric and one literally crying out for
some legislative reform."57 The Minnesota Legislature quickly
responded to his plea in 197658 by enacting a grandparent visi-
tation statute ("the Statute").59
The Statute currently contains three distinct provisions
governing a grandparent's standing to petition for visitation.
The Statute's death provision grants courts jurisdiction to hear
a petition from a grandparent 60 whose child has died.61 The dis-
53. In re Niskanen, 223 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1974) (Yetka, J., concur-
ring). Justice Yetka cited no precedent in support of his conclusion. Id. Subse-
quent courts, however, embraced Justice Yetka's conclusion as a correct
statement of Minnesota's common law. Olson v. Olson, 518 N.W.2d 65, 66
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, No. C7-93-2425 (Minn. Aug. 29, 1994);
In re Welfare of RA.N., 435 N.W.2d 71, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
54. 223 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1974).
55. Id. at 755-56. The grandmother sought visitation rights with her two
grandchildren after her daughter terminated all parental rights, the father's
parental rights were adjudicatively terminated, and the foster parents adopted
the children. Id. at 755. The court denied her request, noting that upon adop-
tion, visitation between the grandchildren and their natural grandparents rests
solely in the discretion of the adoptive parents. Id. at 756.
56. Id. at 757 (Yetka, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Act of Apr. 8,1976, ch. 198, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 670 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 257.022). In explaining the genesis of the bill, Senate sponsors quoted
from Justice Yetka's Niskanen concurrence. See Hearing on H.R. 790 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 69th Minn. Leg. (Mar. 16, 1976) [hereinafter 1976
Senate Comm. Hearing] (statement of Sen. Merriam) (available on tape at the
Minnesota Historical Society, No. 73.Z.4.1B).
59. MiNN. STAT. § 257.022.
60. The Statute gives rights to both grandparents and great-grandparents.
See infra notes 61, 62, 69 (quoting text of Statute). Because both parties retain
identical rights under the Statute, this Note will refer to both under the general
title of grandparents.
61. Subdivision 1 provides:
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solution provision 62 originally granted standing only to parents
of the non-custodial parent to petition during marriage dissolu-
tion proceedings.63 In 1977, however, calling the previous limi-
tation an inadvertent oversight,64 the Minnesota Legislature
amended the provision to afford parents of either party in a dis-
solution proceeding the opportunity to petition a court for visita-
If a parent of an unmarried minor child is deceased, the parents and
grandparents of the deceased parent may be granted reasonable visita-
tion rights to the unmarried minor child during minority by the district
or county court upon finding that visitation rights would be in the best
interests of the child and would not interfere with the parent child re-
lationship. The court shall consider the amount of personal contact be-
tween the parents or grandparents of the deceased parent and the
child prior to the application.
MINN. STAT. § 257.022(1).
62. Subdivision 2 currently reads:
In all proceedings for dissolution, custody, legal separation, annul-
ment, or parentage, after the commencement of the proceeding, or at
any time after completion of the proceedings, and continuing during
the minority of the child, the court may, upon the request of the parent
or grandparent of a party, grant reasonable visitation rights to the un-
married minor child, after dissolution of marriage, legal separation,
annulment, or determination of parentage during minority if it finds
that visitation rights would be in the best interests of the child and
would not interfere with the parent child relationship. The court shall
consider the amount of personal contact between the parents or grand-
parents of the party and the child prior to the application.
MIN. STAT. § 257.022(2).
63. "In all proceedings for dissolution... the court may, upon the request
of the parent or grandparent of a non-custodial party, grant reasonable visita-
tion rights .... " Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 198, § 1(2), 1976 Minn. Laws 670
(codified at M-N. STAT. § 257.022(2)) (emphasis added).
64. House Debate on H.F. 56, 70th Minn. Leg. (Mar. 21, 1977) [hereinafter
1977 House Debate] (statement of Rep. Sieben) (available on tape at the Minne-
sota Historical Society) (stating the discrepancy between ancestors of custodial
and non-custodial parents was unintentional); Hearing on H.. 56 Before the
House Comm. on Health and Welfare, 70th Minn. Leg. (Mar. 15, 1977) [herein-
after 1977 House Comm. Hearing] (statement of Rep. Sieben) (available on tape
at the Minnesota Historical Society, No. 73.Z.2.7B); Hearing on H.F. 56 Before
the Subcomm. on Social Services of the House Comm. on Health and Welfare,
70th Minn. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 House Subcomm. Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Sieben) (available on tape at the Minnesota Historical Soci-
ety). Not all legislators agreed with Representative Sieben. During the Senate
Judiciary Committee debate on the bill, Senator Merriam, the Senate sponsor
of the original grandparent visitation bill, argued courts should interfere with
the parent-child relationship only in the absence of a blood relationship be-
tween the grandparent and custodial parent. Hearing on H.F. 56 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 70th Minn. Leg. (Apr. 29, 1977) [hereinafter 1977
Senate Comm. Hearing] (statement of Sen. Merriam) (available on tape at the
Minnesota Historical Society, No. 73.Z.4.12F). Nonetheless, he later voted in
favor of the bill. 2 1977 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 20, at 2246.
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tion.65 A 1988 amendment 66 further expanded the scope of the
dissolution provision to allow courts to entertain petitions dur-
ing proceedings for custody, legal separation, annulment, or par-
entage.67 In 1993, the legislature confirmed that grandparents
may petition for visitation under the dissolution provision any
time during the child's minority.68
65. Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 238, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 379 (codified at
MIN. STAT. § 257.022(2)). See also Senate Debate on H.F. 56, 70th Minn. Leg.
(May 12, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 Senate Debate] (statement of Sen. Sikorski)
(available on tape at the Minnesota Historical Society) (stating the bill effec-
tively gives parents and grandparents of custodial parents "a day in court");
1977 House Debate, supra note 64 (statement of Rep. Sieben) (stating that the
bill clarifies the right of custodial grandparents to seek visitation rights).
66. Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 668, § 4, 1988 Minn. Laws 1008-09 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 257.022(2)). The legislature included this amendment within a
larger bill significantly altering laws related to child support and spousal main-
tenance awards. Therefore, the legislative history provides little discussion of
the purpose of this amendment to the dissolution provision. One legislator,
however, recognized that the amendment expanded the rights of grandparents
under the Statute and asked that it be deleted from the House version of the
bill so that it could receive appropriate scrutiny and discussion. Hearing on
H.F. 2118 Before the House Subcomm. on Child Support, Custody, and Mainte-
nance of the House Judiciary Comm., 75th Minn. Leg. (Feb. 29, 1988) [hereinaf-
ter 1988 House Subcomm. Hearing] (statement of Rep. Kelly) (available on tape
at the Minnesota Legislative Library). Although the House bill thus did not
contain the provision, the companion Senate bill did. The legislature ultimately
passed a compromise version of the Senate bill. 4 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REeREsENrATIvEs: SEVENTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE 11,300-01
(1988); 4 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE: SEVENTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE
7539 (1988).
67. An "action for parentage" refers to a proceeding under Minnesota's Par-
entage Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51-.75 (1994).
68. Act of Apr. 30, 1993, cl. 62, § 1, 1993 Minn. Laws 201 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 257.022(2)). The House sponsor of the bill believed the amendment did
not expand the rights of grandparents but merely clarified existing law for the
courts. Hearing on H.F. 79 Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
and Family Law of the House Judiciary Comm., 78th Minn. Leg. (Feb. 19,1993)
(statement of Rep. Peterson) (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative
Library). The Senate sponsor, however, understood that the amendment ex-
panded existing rights by permitting courts to entertain grandparent visitation
petitions beyond the end of the underlying family court proceeding. Hearing on
H.F. 79 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Family Law of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 78th Minn. Leg. (Mar. 15, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Senate Subcomm.
Hearing] (statements of Sen. Betzold and Sen. Vickerman) (available on tape at
the Minnesota Legislative Library).
The legislature also added two procedural directives to the Statute in 1993.
Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 322, §§ 3-4, 1993 Minn. Laws 1954 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 257.022(4)-(5)). To defeat the petition of a grandparent who has stand-
ing, parents must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that visitation det-
rimentally interferes with the custodial parent-child relationship. MINN. STAT.
§ 257.022(4). The Statute also prohibits a grandparent from combining a visita-
tion petition with a domestic abuse proceeding. MINN. STAT. § 257.022(5).
1292
GRANDPARENT VISITATION
The legislature added the third standing provision, the co-
habitation provision, 69 in 1977.70 The cohabitation provision al-
lows grandparents to petition for visitation when their
grandchild has lived with them l for a twelve-month period,7 2
69. The cohabitation provision provides:
If an unmarried minor has resided with grandparents or great-grand-
parents for a period of 12 months or more, and is subsequently re-
moved from the home by the minor's parents, the grandparents or
great-grandparents may petition the district or county court for an or-
der granting them reasonable visitation rights to the child during mi-
nority. The court shall grant the petition if it finds that visitation
rights would be in the best interests of the child and would not inter-
fere with the parent and child relationship.
MINN. STAT. § 257.022(2a).
70. Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 238, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 379 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 257.022(2a)). The inspiration for this amendment came from ma-
ternal grandparents who raised their granddaughter in their home for six years
and then cared for her intermittently for the next six years. When the mother
remarried and moved to Minnesota, her new husband denied the grandparents
visitation. The grandparents sought redress with the legislature after being
rejected by Minnesota courts. 1977 Senate Debate, supra note 65 (statement of
Sen. Sikorski); 1977 Senate Comm. Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Sen.
Sikorski); 1977 House Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 64 (statements of Mr. and
Mrs. Gerhard Luderman and Rep. Spanish).
The legislature added the cohabitation provision without serious discussion
as part of the bill removing the word "non-custodial" from the dissolution provi-
sion. See supra note 65 (discussing the 1977 amendment). The original House
version of the bill did not contain a cohabitation provision. During the Senate
committee hearing on the House bill, one legislator emphasized that he wanted
to address proactively the next "tough case" by adding a provision to grant
standing to grandparents who had previously retained custody of their
grandchildren. 1977 Senate Comm. Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Sen.
Davies). The Committee, however, failed to reach a consensus and recom-
mended the bill to pass without any amendment. Id. Senator Sikorsid then
offered the cohabitation provision as an amendment on the Senate floor. 2 1977
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 20, at 2182-83. The Senate adopted the
amendment without discussion, 1977 Senate Debate, supra note 65, and passed
the amended bill the next day. 2 1977 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 20,
at 2246. The House concurred in the Senate amendment without discussion.
1977 House Debate, supra note 64.
71. A growing number of grandparents raise their grandchildren. Between
1980 and 1990, the number of minor children living in households headed by
grandparents rose from 2.3 million to almost 3.5 million. Compare BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS 1, tbl. 1 (1985) with BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, GENERAL POP-
ULATION CHARACTERISTICS: UNITED STATES 54, tbl. 41 (1992). In 1990, over
20,000 Minnesota children lived in households headed by their grandparents.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULA-
TION, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: MINNESOTA, at 142, tbl. 44
(1992). The percentage of racial minorities living in such Minnesota households
(4.5%) is three times that of caucasians (1.5%). Id. For a discussion of the
struggles such grandparents face and the tenuousness of their position, see
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regardless of the marital status of the related parent.73 The
Statute denies standing under any of the three provisions, how-
ever, where a person other than a stepparent or grandparent
adopts the grandchild. 74
Regardless of the standing provision under which grandpar-
ents petition, the Statute directs a court to ascertain whether
visitation is in the "best interests of the child" in determining
whether visitation is warranted. 75 The court must ensure that
Laurie Hertzel, Burden and Joy, MINN. MONTHLY, Jan. 1995, at 46; Rhonda
Hillbery, Grandparents Playing Larger Roles When Their Children Can't Raise
Kids, STAR TaRm. (Minneapolis), Oct. 13, 1994, at IA.
72. The legislature apparently intended the cohabitation provision to grant
standing to grandparents who previously held custody of their grandchildren.
See supra note 70 (summarizing the origin of the amendment). The legislative
history gives no clear indication as to why the legislature chose 12 months as
the cohabitation period. The legislature may have intended to analogize the
cohabitation provision to the common law in loco parentis doctrine. Under that
doctrine, "a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by
assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going
through the formalities necessary to legal adoption" is nonetheless treated as a
parent. London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Smith, 64 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minm.
1954) (citations omitted). The legislature may have imposed a statutory mini-
mum cohabitation period to avoid the litigation created by the common law's
fact-specific inquiry. Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
73. In appropriate circumstances, the cohabitation provision allows grand-
parents to seek visitation with grandchildren living in an intact family. MmN.
STAT. § 257.022(2a).
Recently, the legislature granted similar visitation rights to persons other
than foster parents, but requires that those persons live with a child for at least
two years rather than one. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 248, § 1, 1989 Minn. Laws
835 (codified at MiNN. STAT. § 257.022(2b)). That subdivision codifies, but does
not supplant, rights existing under the common law for adults in loco parentis
to a child. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d at 791 (upholding grant of visitation to former
stepparent who lived with child for only 18 months). Unlike the analogous co-
habitation provision in subdivision 2a, subdivision 2b specifically requires the
petitioner to prove an established parent-child relationship. MIN. STAT.
§ 257.022(2b). In addition, that subdivision requires a court to consider the
child's reasonable preferences with respect to visitation. Id.
74. MINN. STAT. § 257.022(3). The provision also automatically terminates
any visitation rights granted under the Statute upon such adoption. Id. See
also In re Adoption of A.M.R. & D.N.R., 527 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (construing the adoption exception). This provision largely equates the
rights of grandparents to those of parents upon adoption. Adoption relieves
natural parents and the adopted child of all rights and duties relative to the
other. MviuN. STAT. § 259.59(1) (1994). The Statute's adoption exception severs
all legal ties between the grandparent and the adopted grandchild, unless a
grandparent or stepparent adopts the grandchild. M1NN. STAT. § 257.022(3).
Many other states, through statute or judicial decree, enforce a similar excep-
tion to their grandparent visitation statutes. Bopp v. Lino, 885 P.2d 559, 561
(Nev. 1994); 2 ATmNSON, supra note 12, § 8.15.
75. See supra notes 61, 62, 69 (quoting the Statute).
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visitation will "not interfere with the parent child relation-
ship."76 The Statute, however, defines neither term.77 Under
the death and dissolution provisions, the court also must con-
sider the amount of personal contact between grandparent and
grandchild in adjudicating the petition.78 The cohabitation pro-
vision presumes that a twelve-month cohabitation period pro-
vides sufficient personal contact and thus does not require
courts to consider the quality of the grandparent-grandchild
relationship. 79
In January 1995, four members of the Minnesota House of
Representatives introduced a bill designed to greatly expand ex-
isting grandparent visitation rights.80 The bill would repeal the
three existing standing provisions 81 and would instead give par-
ents of either custodial or non-custodial parents standing to pe-
tition for visitation any time a court determines that visitation
is in the best interests of the grandchild and would not interfere
with the parent-child relationship.8 2 In contrast to the existing
76. See id. If the issue of grandparent visitation cannot be settled amicably
but instead reaches court, some animosity undoubtedly will exist between the
custodial parent and the petitioning grandparent. Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40
N.Y.2d 522, 526 (1976). The relevant question then becomes whether both par-
ties can suppress their differences for the benefit of the grandchild. Minnesota
courts have not addressed what constitutes "interference with the parent-child
relationship." See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text (summarizing the
few appellate decisions construing the Statute, none of which addresses the ani-
mosity of the parties). For an overview of relevant decisions in other states, see
2 ATKINSON, supra note 12, § 8.17.
77. See infra notes 150-157 and accompanying text (discussing the ambigu-
ity of terms used in the Statute).
78. See MmN. STAT. § 257.022(1)-(2); see also supra notes 61-62 (quoting
these provisions). The Statute does not clearly dictate whether the amount of
personal contact informs the determination of the child's best interests or af-
fects the court's adjudication of the visitation petition in some other, undefined
way. See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text (analyzing the personal
contact requirement).
79. See supra note 69 (quoting the cohabitation provision of the Statute).
80. MIN. H.F. 53, 79th Leg. § 257.022 (1995).
81. Id. § 257.022(2).
82. Id. § 257.022(1). The new standing provision would read as follows:
A grandparent... may petition ... for reasonable visitation rights to
an unmarried minor child during the child's minority. Visitation
rights may be granted regardless of who has custody of the child. Visi-
tation shall be ordered if the court finds that it would be in the best
interests of the child and would not interfere with the relationship be-
tween the child and the parent, guardian, or other custodian with
whom the child resides.
Id. The proposal would equate Minnesota's law with the broad, open-ended
statutes enacted in several otherjurisdictions. See supra note 36 (citing several
broadly-worded state statutes). It goes further than the model statutes pro-
posed by some commentators, which are designed to eliminate arbitrary line-
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statutory framework, the proposed bill would not limit when a
grandparent may file visitation petitions to enumerated court
proceedings. 83 The proposal also would eliminate the require-
ment that courts analyze the existing grandparent-grandchild
relationship in determining whether to award visitation.8 4
D. NARROWING THE STATUTE THROUGH JUDIcAL
INTERPRETATION: OLSON V OLSON
In the few cases in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals
has interpreted the Statute,8 5 the court repeatedly has con-
strued it narrowly,8 6 despite the seemingly broad legislative
mandate.8 7 For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals re-
peatedly affirms that the Statute does not authorize courts to
ignore standing requirements and look only at the best interests
drawing. See Fernndez, supra note 16, at 129-32 (making grandparent visita-
tion dependent upon a "substantial relationship" rather than any underlying
family disruption); Bostock, supra note 32, at 369-71 (same).
83. The Statute currently allows grandparents to file visitation petitions
following the death of the related parent, following proceedings for divorce, cus-
tody, legal separation, annulment, or parentage, or upon the cohabitation of the
grandparent and the grandchild. See supra notes 61, 62, 69 (quoting the
Statute).
84. See supra note 82 (quoting the proposed amendment).
85. The Statute has been cited in twelve appellate decisions since enact-
ment. Gary v. Hauschildt, No. C4-94-1968, 1995 WL 90168, at *2-*3 ((Minn.
Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1995); In re Adoption ofA.M.R. & D.N.R., 527 N.W.2d 565, 565-
68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Courey v. Courey, 524 N.W.2d 469, 472-73 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994); Barber v. Olimb, No. C1-94-566, 1994 WL 373424, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 19, 1994); Olson v. Olson, 518 N.W.2d 65, 66-67 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994), review granted, No. C7-93-2425 (Minn. Aug. 29, 1994); Weiler v. Lutz,
501 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd sub nom., Valentine v. Lutz,
512 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. 1994); In re Guardianship of J.R.F., No. C5-92-33, 1992
WL 166784, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 1992); Simmons v. Simmons, 486
N.W.2d 788, 790-91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175,
180-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. CX-90-2629 (Minn. Aug. 29,
1991); Westphal v. Westphal, 457 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Koes-
ter v. Anderson, No. C6-90-134, 1990 WL 68619, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 29,
1990); In re Welfare of RA.N., 435 N.W.2d 71, 72-73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
86. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussing strict judicial
interpretations of the Statute). In strictly construing the Statute, the courts
have held that it does not broadly preempt existing common law rights unless
the legislature explicitly expresses such an intent. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d at
791.
87. See, e.g., supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing legisla-
tive expansion of the dissolution provision). Other state courts broadly con-
strue their statutes. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing
expansive judicial constructions of broad statutes).
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of the child in granting visitation to third parties.88 The court
also imposes a heavy burden of proof on grandparents under the
Statute by requiring them to make a prima facie case establish-
ing all statutory factors before being entitled to a trial on the
merits.8 9 The Minnesota Court of Appeals justified this result
by noting that the common law grants no independent visitation
rights to third parties and that this approach furthers public
policy, which favors development of and harmony within a fam-
ily unit.90
Recently, in Olson v. Olson,91 the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals continued its strict interpretation of the Statute by nar-
rowly construing standing under the dissolution provision. The
court denied a maternal grandmother's request for visitation
with her eight-year-old granddaughter after the divorce of the
related parent, the grandmother's daughter, who objected to vis-
itation.92 The appellate court first determined the grandmother
had no standing under common law to petition for visitation be-
cause the grandparent's common law derivative visitation
right93 is enforceable only against the unrelated parent.94 De-
88. Kulla, 472 N.W.2d at 183; RAN., 435 N.W.2d at 73. The court ac-
knowledged that this decision sometimes might be detrimental to both the
grandchild and the grandparents. RAN., 435 N.W.2d at 73-74.
89. Kulla, 472 N.W.2d at 180-81. The Kulla court rejected the petitioner's
argument that, because parents possess the information regarding the parent-
child relationship, she should not have to prove that visitation rights would not
interfere with the parent-child relationship. Id.
90. Id. at 181-82.
91. 518 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, No. 07-93-2425
(Minm. Aug. 29, 1994).
92. Id. at 67. Although the grandmother and mother maintained a very
close relationship following the granddaughter's birth, conflict arose between
the two women after the mother's divorce, and the mother denied the grand-
mother any opportunity to see her grandchild. Id. at 66. Appellant's Brief to
the Minnesota Supreme Court at 3, Olson (No. C7-93-2425). The grandmother
petitioned for visitation in order to continue the close relationship she shared
with her grandchild. The parties agreed the grandmother was very important
to her granddaughter. Id.
The parties originally attempted to mediate their dispute through the De-
partment of Court Services. Id. at 3-4. They reached visitation agreements in
1992 and again in 1993, but each time the mother refused to comply with the
terms of each agreement. Id. at 4. The court ordered further mediation. Id. A
family court referee then determined it was in the child's best interest to con-
tinue visitation and established a visitation schedule. Id. at 5. To protect the
relationship between mother and grandchild, the court ordered the grand-
mother and mother to refrain from making negative comments about each
other. Id. The mother, unhappy with the mediated settlement, asked the trial
court to review the order. Id.
93. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (explaining the common
law derivative rights theory).
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spite evidence of a contrary legislative intent,9 5 the court then
determined that the Statute merely codified the common law
and thus provided the grandmother, the mother of the custodial
parent, no legal basis for her claim.9 6 The court reasoned that
providing relief to a grandparent over the related parent's objec-
tion in a dissolution context "makes little sense" because the
Statute does not allow such relief when the spouse of the related
parent dies or the family is intact.97 The court did not specifi-
cally address the best interests of the child,98 but merely noted
that allowing visitation in this case would be "potentially
disturbing."99
II. EXPOSING THE STATUTE'S INCOHERENCE
AND AMBIGUITY
Olson highlights the judiciary's difficulty in applying the
terms of the inconsistent and incoherent Statute. 0 0 The Stat-
ute lacks coherence and confuses courts by purposely distin-
guishing among classes of grandparents based on the family and
custodial status of their related child.10 1 Rather than reflecting
a reasoned balancing of the conflicting interests of grandpar-
ents, parents, and grandchildren, the Statute demonstrates an
intermittent legislative reaction to a powerful grandparent
lobby.' 0 2 The Statute also presents only a vague outline of the
94. Olson, 518 N.W.2d at 66.
95. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing the legisla-
tive expansion of dissolution provision).
96. Olson, 518 N.W.2d at 67.
97. Id. The court viewed its decision as consistent with its prior decisions
"recogniz[ing] the public policy reasons that support a denial of visitation to
uphold the independence and decision-making integrity of the newly created
family unit." Id. (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.N., 435 N.W.2d 71, 72 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989)).
98. See supra note 92 (summarizing the referee's findings). The referee
concluded visitation would be in the best interests of the child. Appellant's
Brief at 5, Olson (No. C7-93-2425).
99. 518 N.W.2d at 67.
100. Id. at 65.
101. See infra part II.B (discussing the inconsistency of standing
requirements).
102. Statements in the legislative history evidence the strength of Minne-
sota's grandparent lobby. See, e.g., 1988 House Subcomm. Hearing, supra note
66 (statement of Rep. Vallenga) (noting she introduced the bill after learning of
problems with the existing statute); 1977 Senate Debate, supra note 65 (state-
ment of Sen. Sikorski) (noting the sponsors intended the 1977 amendment to
help Mr. and Mrs. Gerhard Luderman, grandparents trying to win visitation
rights with their grandchild); 1976 Senate Comm. Hearing, supra note 58
(statement of Sen. Merriam) (noting that the plight of the grandparents in the
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standards for courts to apply in adjudicating visitation peti-
tions.10 3 It thus provides neither notice to parents of when their
actions might result in state intervention nor sufficient guidance
to courts to ensure the consistent application of the state's police
power.10 4 Finally, the Statute does not address several impor-
tant visitation issues addressed in Minnesota's parental visita-
tion statutes.10 5 As a result, both parents and grandparents
criticize the Statute.10 6
A. OZsoA- COMPLETING THE COURT'S STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The Olson court erroneously denied visitation on the basis
of the Statute's lack of positive language granting standing to
the petitioning grandparents. 0 7 The court flagrantly miscon-
strued the dissolution provision, which actually does not restrict
the class of grandparents who may petition for visitation under
the Statute.108 The Olson court also ignored the Statute's legis-
lative history, which demonstrates a clear intent to open the ju-
dicial system to grandparents from both sides of the family in a
dissolution proceeding.10 9 In fact, the legislatures amended the
Statute specifically to provide parents of both custodial and non-
case of In re Niskanen, 223 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1974), provided the genesis for
the original Statute). The proposed amendment introduced in the 1995 Minne-
sota Legislature resulted from 18 months of intensive lobbying by grandparent
groups. See supra note 15 (discussing the genesis for the proposal).
103. See infra notes 146-160 and accompanying text (discussing the Stat-
ute's undefined standards).
104. See GOLDsTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 15-18 (arguing that statutes
authorizing state interference with the family should give parents "fair warning
of what constitutes a breach of their child care responsibilities" and "notice of
the extent of the state's power to intervene" as well as provide guidance to
courts and agencies to avoid unlimited discretion).
105. MiNN. STAT. §§ 257.025, 518.17 (1994). See infra notes 172-178 and ac-
companying text (comparing grandparent visitation to non-custodial parent
visitation).
106. Minnesota grandparent-visitation advocates were "dismayed" by the
Court of Appeals decision in Olson and proposed new legislation to expand
grandparents' rights. Hillbery, supra note 15, at 5A. On the other side of the
debate, parents question whether courts should even interfere in disputes be-
tween a grandparent and the related parent. Id.
107. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (summarizing the court's
reasoning).
108. See supra note 62 (quoting the text of dissolution provision). The text
refers only to "party" without modifying language describing the required rela-
tionship between the petitioning grandparent and the party.
109. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the 1977
amendment according parents of either party the opportunity to petition for
visitation).
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custodial parents "a day in court."110 The sponsors knew that
particular amendment would grant greater rights to grandpar-
ents whose child had divorced than to grandparents whose child
had died or lived in an intact family.111 Nonetheless, legislators
passed the amendment to remove the standing inequality be-
tween sets of grandparents upon dissolution of their child's mar-
riage.112 Although the Olson court raises an appealing point by
suggesting that these standing distinctions "make[] little
sense,"113 the court's reasoning should not override either the
clear legislative intent or the Statute's express language.
B. THE INCONSISTENCY OF STANDING
Although the Olson court reached the wrong result, it cor-
rectly identified the Statute's inconsistencies. Because the cur-
rent Statute reflects a patchwork of legislative amendments, it
distinguishes between classes of grandparents in determining
who gets "a day in court."'1 4 On the one hand, the death provi-
sion11 5 strictly follows the common law derivative rights theory
by granting standing only to grandparents whose access to their
grandchild is impaired by their child's death.1 16 In contrast, the
dissolution provision,'1 7 as properly interpreted, grants stand-
ing to grandparents regardless of the custodial status of the re-
lated parent.118 The cohabitation provision' 19 similarly allows
visitation regardless of custodial status, even over the objection
of married parents in an intact family.
110. See supra note 65 (citing relevant legislative history).
111. One member of the House Committee considering the bill also noted
the amendment would give more rights to grandparents upon divorce than they
would have if there were no dissolution or no marriage at all. 1977 House
Comm. Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Rep. Forsythe). The legislature
thus demonstrated its awareness of the very distinction that concerned the Ol-
son court.
112. 1977 House Comm. Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Rep. Sieben).
113. 518 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, No. C7-93-
2425 (Minn. Aug. 29, 1994).
114. See supra note 65 (citing relevant legislative history).
115. 1IMhN. STAT. § 257.022(1); see also supra note 61 (quoting this
provision).
116. See supra notes 22-26 (discussing the common law derivative rights
theory).
117. MINN. STAT. § 257.022(2); see also supra note 62 (quoting this
provision).
118. See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text (criticizing the holding
of Olson as contrary to legislative intent).
119. M-NN. STAT. § 257.022(2a); see also supra note 69 (quoting this
provision).
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1. The Death Provision: Unnecessarily Narrow
The death provision closely follows the common law deriva-
tive rights theory by limiting standing to parents of the deceased
spouse. The Statute apparently presumes that parents of the
surviving parent will have access to their grandchild through
their child. If the legislature merely intended to ensure that "no
child should be cut off entirely from one side of its family,"120 the
presumption may make sense. 121 The presumption also pre-
vents courts from becoming involved in inter-generational farn-
ily disputes. 122
The Statute, however, purports to protect the best interests
of all children.' 23 Given that purpose, it is unclear why the Stat-
ute ensures access for only one side of the family. Although
studies differ on the unique benefits of grandparent visita-
tion,124 they show that the quality and strength of support a
child receives following the death of a parent may protect the
child from later psychiatric disorders. 12 5 Maintaining existing
ties to adults outside the nuclear family may help minimize a
120. Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 385 A.2d 992, 995 (Pa. 1978).
121. In that case, an unbroken blood relationship exists between the grand-
parent, the surviving parent, and the grandchild. The Statute therefore pro-
tects only the side of the family no longer represented by the deceased parent.
122. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
behind the strict common law rule).
123. See supra note 42 (noting courts use grandparent visitation statutes to
promote the rights of grandchildren to visit their grandparents, not the re-
verse). See also supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text (discussing the impe-
tus for grandparent visitation statutes). The state protects children in these
situations under the guise of its parens patriae power. See supra note 30 (dis-
cussing the state's parens patriae power).
124. One group of researchers concluded grandparents play a significant
role in the emotional life of a grandchild, regardless of the amount of contact
between the two. Children who maintained significant contact with their
grandparents benefitted emotionally, while children who spent little or no time
with their grandparents expressed distress and resentment. ARTHUR
KoRNnABER, M.D. & KENNETH L. WooDwARD, GRANDPARENTS/GRANDCHILDREN:
THE VrriAL CONNECTION 37-42 (1985). The researchers concluded grandchildren
feel "a natural connection between themselves and their grandparents," and
that children possess "a strong emotional need for close attachment to at least
one grandparent." Id. at 51.
Commentators criticized the scientific methodology of that research, partic-
ularly because other researchers have been unable to duplicate the results. In-
gulli, supra note 9, at 299-300. Indeed, other researchers concluded that
physical proximity of grandparents and grandchildren correlated with "poorer
behavioral and psychological adjustment." Id. at 300.
125. Ingulli, supra note 9, at 311-12 (citing Norman Garmezy, Stressors of
Childhood, in STRESS, COPING AND DEVELOPMENT N CHILDREN 59 (Norman
Garmezy & Michael Rutter eds., 1983)).
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child's sense of grief and loss following a parent's death.126 In
addition, granting standing to parents of both custodial and non-
custodial parents under the death provision ensures a remedy
for grandparents who have provided significant assistance in
raising grandchildren. 127 Therefore, the death provision should
grant standing to grandparents on both sides of the family.128
2. The Dissolution Provision: Rigid But Constitutional
The dissolution provision furthers several laudable goals in
limiting the instances in which grandparents may file visitation
petitions to a list of specific family court proceedings. 129 The
enumeration adds needed statutory clarity, thereby providing
proper notice to parties and guidance to the courts.' 30 Limiting
judicial intervention to situations involving disruption of the nu-
clear family is also consistent with the state's traditional use of
its inherent police power. 131 The legislature rightly presumed
that the disruption or absence of a nuclear family causes harm
to the child sufficient to justify interfering with the custodial
parent's traditional autonomy. 132 The 1995 Minnesota Legisla-
ture's proposed amendment, which contains an open-ended
standing provision, achieves neither of these goals. 133
126. Id. at 312.
127. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (detailing the conflict that
arose between a custodial mother and a maternal grandmother who had pro-
vided significant assistance in rearing grandchild).
128. The proposed 1995 amendment to the statute adopts this expanded
view of standing in the death context. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying
text (discussing standing under the proposed amendment).
129. The dissolution provision grants standing to grandparents "[i]n all pro-
ceedings for dissolution, custody, legal separation, annulment, or parentage."
MuiNN. STAT. § 257.022(2); see also supra note 62 (quoting the statute). Grand-
parents, however, may bring a visitation petition any time during the minority
of their grandchild. MIN. STAT. § 257.022(2); see also supra note 68 and accom-
panying text (quoting this provision).
130. See supra note 104 (discussing the need for statutory guidelines). Stat-
utory clarity is particularly important in the area of grandparent visitation to
avoid potential negative effects on grandchildren from needless litigation. In-
guli, supra note 9, at 297-98.
131. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (discussing the two-step
test for invocation of state's parens patriae power). The proposed Minnesota
amendment fails to follow this traditional two-step test. Presuming harm
through an open-ended statute thus may unconstitutionally infringe on paren-
tal autonomy.
132. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (quoting a New Hampshire
court that noted the deference accorded to parental autonomy presumes a nu-
clear family consisting of two parents).
133. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing standing
under the proposed bill).
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The existing dissolution provision, however, unnecessarily
confines standing to narrowly-defined situations.' 3 4 For exam-
ple, the dissolution provision allows parents of either parent to
petition for visitation after the courts judicially establish the
parentage of their grandchild. 135 This provision fails to recog-
nize that the legal parentage is not adjudicated for every child
born out of wedlock.136 Moreover, the Statute does not allow
grandparents to petition for visitation when grandchildren are
placed in foster homes or subjected to a family trauma not re-
solved through divorce, judicial separation, or annulment.137 A
grandparent's standing to petition for visitation thus depends
more on the related parent's contact with the judicial system
rather than on the best interests of the child.
Intra-family litigation represents a significant source of
stress for children.' 38 The legislature thus may have limited its
134. The legislature amended the Statute only as constituents brought
seemingly inequitable situations to the legislature's attention. See supra notes
62-68 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the dissolution provi-
sion); supra note 102 (discussing the genesis of the amendments).
135. Generally, a putative parent may file a judicial action for parentage
under Minnesota's Parentage Act to establish a legally-recognized parent-child
relationship. See MmN. STAT. §§ 257.51-.74.
136. For example, the mother may establish a parent-child relationship by
proving that she gave birth to the child. MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a). Realistically,
there should be few actions challenging the mother's parental status. In most
cases, then, maternal grandparents do not possess standing to petition for visi-
tation until paternity is judicially determined.
More extensive provisions govern the legal recognition of the paternity of a
child born out of wedlock. The Parentage Act, however, is not self-executing. It
merely ensures that the child receives adequate support. See In re Karger's
Estate, 93 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Minn. 1958) (discussing the remedial nature of
paternity proceedings). If the mother and child do not seek to establish pater-
nity to secure support and if the father does not wish to seek custody of or visi-
tation with the child, the state is not required sua sponte to bring an action for
parentage. The state may, however, bring an action through the agency
"chargeable by law with the support of the child." MINN. STAT. § 257.57(2)
(1994). Grandparents may bring an action to judicially determine their child's
parental status only when the mother and presumed father have not married
and the grandparent's child has died or is a minor. Id.
137. See Fernandez, supra note 16, at 121 (enumerating situations of nu-
clear family disruptions that remain unaddressed by the majority of grandpar-
ent visitation statutes). Grandparent groups advocate the expansion of the
Statute to cover situations of abuse and neglect. See, e.g., 1993 Senate Sub-
comm. Hearings, supra note 68 (statements of Luverne Knoll, Kathleen Stutz,
and Muriel Hinich). Professor Fernandez suggests "[g]randparent access may
provide support for the unprepared mother, as well as protection for the child
against parental ignorance, abuse, or neglect." Fernandez, supra note 16, at
116.
138. Nolan, supra note 8, at 67 (citing Jody George, Children and Grandpar-
ents: The Right to Visit, 8 CHILDREN's LEGAL RTs. J. 1, 4 (1987)); Bostock, supra
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enumeration in order to minimize judicial intrusions into the
family. The extent of judicial action, however, varies widely,
even within the enumerated family situation. 13 9 Moreover, the
legislature must not have been concerned about litigation per se
because it amended the Statute to allow grandparents to bring
an action even after a judicial proceeding is concluded but dur-
ing the minority of the child.140 Finally, the legislature may
more effectively address its concern over excessive litigation by
restricting the class of grandparents based on the quality of the
grandparent-grandchild relationship, as discussed below,141
rather than arbitrarily limiting standing. The legislature
achieves essential clarity by enumerating the family court pro-
ceedings after which a grandparent may seek visitation rights.
The legislature, however, due to a lack of foresight, has unneces-
sarily limited standing to the exclusion of situations where visi-
tation otherwise might be both justifiable and beneficial to the
child.
3. The Cohabitation Provision: An Unprincipled Deviation
from its Common Law Origins
The cohabitation provision partially codifies a correspond-
ing common law doctrine' 42 by granting standing to any grand-
parent who has lived with a grandchild for twelve months.
143
The provision deviates from the common law, however, in that it
neither requires that grandparents prove they had a custodial
relationship with the grandchild nor defines the residency re-
quirement sufficient to justify a presumed custodial relation-
note 32, at 366 (citing Andre P. Derdeyn, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Ren-
dering Family Dissension More Pronounced?, 55 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 277,
285 (1985)).
139. For example, court involvement in an uncontested divorce, separation,
or annulment is much less extensive than in contested cases. Ingulli, supra
note 9, at 312-13. Furthermore, in the case of unwed parents, the mother and
father may recognize the paternity of the father in a writing signed by them
and filed with the state. MINN. STAT. § 257.75(1). In certain situations, that
recognition "has the force and effect of a judgment or order determining the
existence of the parent and child relationship" although neither party appears
before a judge. MIN. STAT. § 257.75(3).
140. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the 1988
amendment).
141. See infra notes 158-166 and accompanying text (recommending that an
existing relationship be a prerequisite to standing).
142. See supra note 72 (defining the in loco parentis doctrine).
143. Compare MINN. STAT. § 257.022(2a) (requiring a cohabitation period of
12 months for grandparents) with MIN. STAT. § 257.022(2b) (requiring a co-
habitation period of 24 months for persons other than grandparents).
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ship. For example, the Statute does not explicitly require a
consecutive cohabitation period.1 44 It also does not distinguish
situations where the grandparent and grandchild lived together
without the parent from situations where the three generations
resided together. When the parent lives in the household and
serves as the authority figure, it may not be realistic to presume
the grandparent stands in a custodial relationship to the
grandchild. Furthermore, the provision may unconstitutionally
infringe on the parents' right of autonomy by authorizing grand-
parent visitation rights absent either a prior custodial relation-
ship or a showing of harm to the grandchild from a lack of
visitation.145
C. THE UNCERTAINTY OF VISITATION AwARDs
Even if grandparents have standing, the courts must adju-
dicate their petition using undefined and inconsistent stan-
dards. The Statute sets forth only two standards to guide a
court's adjudication of a grandparent's visitation petition: the
best interests of the child and non-interference with the parent-
child relationship.1 46 The Statute, however, defines neither
term, creating uncertainty for both courts and parties. 147 In ad-
dition, the Statute does not dictate the relevance of the existing
144. See MIN. STAT. § 257.022(2a). Arguably, a grandparent who resided
with a grandchild for one month of each year for 12 years may petition for visi-
tation under the literal language of the Statute. The relationship between
grandparent and grandchild in such a case likely presents a qualitatively differ-
ent situation than if the two had lived together for 12 consecutive months.
145. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (discussing the constitu-
tional balancing of parental autonomy rights and the state's parens patriae
power). Although the state may reasonably presume such harm in cases of nu-
clear family disruption, traditionally the state does not make the same pre-
sumption in the intact family. For example, the state may transfer legal
custody away from the legal parents only in limited situations. E.g., M-N.
STAT. § 260.185 (1994) (transferring custody in the case of a delinquent child);
MmN. STAT. § 260.191 (1994) (providing for children in need of protection or
services or who are neglected and in foster care); MN. STAT. § 260.241 (1994)
(discussing termination of parental rights).
146. See supra notes 61, 62, 69 (quoting relevant provisions of Statute).
147. The problems caused by the lack of definitive guidance remain under
the amendment introduced into the 1995 Minnesota Legislature. See supra
note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed amendment).
It took an extreme situation for the courts to address the best interests
standard under the Statute. In In re Guardianship of J.R.F., the court upheld
the district's decision denying a man convicted of murdering his wife the right
to visit his wife's children, with whom he lived for eight years but did not adopt.
No. C5-92-33, 1992 WL 166784, at *1-*2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 1992). The
court based its decision on the age of the children (11 and 6), and the testimony
of the children's psychologist that visitation would not be in their best interest.
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grandparent-grandchild relationship, although the Statute re-
quires courts to consider that relationship in adjudicating cer-
tain visitation petitions.' 48 Most troublesome is that the extent
of judicial discretion involved in granting or denying visitation
ultimately depends on the provision under which the grandpar-
ent must petition due to the family circumstances.' 49
1. Vague Standards and Judicial Bias
The legislature may have intended the courts to construe
the Statute's "best interests of the child" standard consistently
with its construction under parental custody and visitation stat-
utes.'50 Those statutes list specific factors a court should con-
sider in awarding visitation to a noncustodial parent.' 5 ' In
addition, those statutes limit judicial discretion by requiring a
court to consider all the enumerated factors and to make de-
tailed findings explaining how each factor led to its ultimate
best interests determination.15 2
Failing to define statutorily "the best interests of the child"
or require specific findings does allow the court to tailor its judg-
ment to the needs of the particular child. In the grandparent
visitation arena, however, unlike in parental custody and visita-
tion proceedings, these omissions allow a court to exercise virtu-
ally unlimited discretion in making its best interests
Id. at *1. The court did not, however, discuss the factors it used to determine
the best interests of the child. Id.
148. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing this statutory
requirement).
149. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (discussing the three pro-
visions governing standing).
150. MINN. STAT. § 257.025 (outlining the factors evaluated in custody dis-
putes outside the dissolution context); 1MIN. STAT. § 518.17 (discussing custody
and support of children upon marriage dissolution). Those two statutes contain
the only enumeration of factors Minnesota courts should consider in determin-
ing the best interests of the child.
151. Those factors include: the wishes of the child and the parent(s); the
intimacy of the parent-child relationship; the relationship between the child
and siblings, parents, or other persons who may significantly affect the child's
best interests; the mental and physical health of parties involved; and the ca-
pacity of each party to give the child love, affection, and guidance. MMN. STAT.
§ 257.025(a); MwN. STAT. § 518.17(1). The grandparent visitation statute spe-
cifically authorizes a court to consider the preferences of the child only in adju-
dicating the visitation petition of a person other than a grandparent who has
lived with a child. See supra note 73 (summarizing provisions of MIN. STAT.
§ 257.022(2b)).
152. MNN. STAT. §§ 257.025(a)(12), 518.171(1)(13).
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determination. 153 Such discretion allows a judge's personal bi-
ases to influence the decision.154 The lack of definitive stan-
dards also encourages litigation because neither party in a
visitation dispute knows what a court might consider in its de-
termination. 155 That litigation may unnecessarily harm the
grandchild. 156 The Statute's failure to define what constitutes
interference with the parent-child relationship creates similar
problems of judicial bias and uncertainty.157
2. The Uncertainty of the Relevance of the Existing
Grandparent-Grandchild Relationship
The death and dissolution provisions direct courts to con-
sider the amount of personal contact between the grandparent
and grandchild prior to the time a grandparent files the petition
for visitation.'5 8 The Statute, however, does not dictate whether
that contact informs the court's determination of the best inter-
ests of the child or whether that existing relationship is a pre-
requisite to standing.' 59 Read most logically, the Statute directs
the court to consider the amount of contact in determining
153. Appellate courts will not reverse a trial courts determination of the
best interests of a child absent clear abuse of discretion. Manthei v. Manthei,
268 N.W.2d 45, 45-46 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam).
154. "[T]he fact that most judges are old enough to have grandchildren
themselves may have a tremendous influence on the outcome of any given law-
suit." Ferndndez, supra note 16, at 129.
155. A few state statutes list factors courts should consider when determin-
ing whether grandparent visitation is in the best interests of the child. Bosteck,
supra note 32, at 355 n.190 (citing relevant state statutes). The American Bar
Association also recommends that statutes outline the relevant factors courts
should consider. COMMSSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, A.B.A-, RE-
PORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1989), reprinted in Preserving Generational
Bonds, supra note 32, at 19-20.
156. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (citing psychologists as
agreeing that litigation represents a significant source of stress for children).
157. Judges also may confuse interference with the parent-child relation-
ship with their determination of the best interests of the child. E.g., Moses v.
Cober, 641 N.E.2d 668, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (remanding for review of child's
best interests because trial court focused on relationship between grandmother
and mother rather than grandmother and grandchild).
158. See supra notes 61-62 (quoting the Statute). The proposed amendment
introduced into the 1995 Minnesota Legislature would remove this requirement
entirely. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing the pro-
posed amendment).
159. Compare MmiN. STAT. § 257.022(1) with IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35
(West Supp. 1994) ("A petition for grandchild visitation rights shall be granted
only upon a finding... that the grandparent had established a substantial
relationship with the child prior to the filing of the petition.").
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whether to grant visitation. 160 It thus constitutes another ele-
ment in determining the best interests of the child.
In contrast to the death and dissolution provisions, the co-
habitation provision does not direct courts to consider the
amount of personal contact between a grandparent and
grandchild prior to the time a grandparent files an application
for visitation.161 Personal contact thus becomes irrelevant both
to standing and the best interests determination. The Statute
presumes, without justifying the presumption, 162 that a grand-
parent and grandchild who have lived together will form a suffi-
ciently strong bond to warrant visitation. 63 Although it may be
reasonable to presume that a grandchild who has resided with a
grandparent has a stronger attachment than a grandchild who
periodically visits a grandparent, it is unreasonable to presume
uniformity in all situations where grandparents and grandchil-
dren reside together. The Statute's failure to define clearly
whether the cohabitation period must be consecutive and exclu-
sive of the parents amplifies the unreasonableness of this
presumption.' 64
A better approach may be to require an existing relation-
ship between grandparent and grandchild as a prerequisite to
standing in all situations. Psychologists generally agree that
maintaining emotional ties is essential to a child's healthy de-
velopment. 165 Where no such close relationship exists, the emo-
160. Although this conclusion may be logical, it is not indisputable. By plac-
ing the language regarding the strength of the grandparent-grandchild rela-
tionship after the best interests language, the legislature implied courts should
consider the relationship in evaluating the best interests of the child. See supra
notes 61-62 (quoting the text of death and dissolution provisions). In contrast
to the death and dissolution provisions, the cohabitation provision does not di-
rect courts to consider the amount of personal contact prior to application, even
though the language regarding the best interests of the child is identical in the
three provisions. See supra note 69 (quoting the cohabitation provision). The
distinction thus creates uncertainty regarding whether the amount of personal
contact informs the determination of the best interest of the child or influences
the adjudication of visitation in some other, undefined way.
161. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (distinguishing the co-
habitation provision from the death and dissolution provisions).
162. See supra note 70 (discussing the dearth of recorded legislative debate).
163. In contrast, the Statute requires such a showing when the petitioning
party is a person other than a grandparent who has lived with a child. See
supra note 73 (discussing MmN. STAT. § 257.022(2b)).
164. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (highlighting this ambiguity
in the cohabitation provision).
165. GoLDsTEIN Err ., supra note 9, at 31-32; Bartlett, supra note 7, at 902.
Cf. Ingulli, supra note 9, at 318 (citing a study concluding that children in long-
term foster care benefit from contact with their biological family). The adverse
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tional harm to the grandchild from the litigation conflict
between parent and grandparent may exceed any benefits of
grandparent visitation. 166 The goal of the Statute, therefore,
should be to maintain the grandchild's beneficial emotional ties.
By making the existing relationship a prerequisite to standing,
the legislature can protect parents and grandchildren from un-
necessary litigation and help ensure that courts hear only those
disputes where visitation might arguably be in the child's best
interest. Making the relationship a prerequisite to standing
also forces courts to focus their subsequent best interests deter-
mination on the grandchild rather than the grandparent.
3. Judicial Discretion Versus Mandatory Visitation Awards
Once a court determines that visitation is in the best inter-
ests of the child and will not interfere with the parent-child rela-
tionship, the right to visitation differs according to the status of
the petitioning grandparent. Under the death and dissolution
provisions, courts have discretion in awarding visitation.' 67 In
contrast, the Statute mandates visitation under the cohabitation
provision. 168 The proposed amendment introduced into the
1995 Minnesota Legislature would mandate visitation in all
cases.
169
The legislative history sheds no light on the reason for the
distinction under the existing framework. 170 It is illogical to im-
consequences of discontinuity may be severe. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 9,
at 32-34.
166. Bostock, supra note 32, at 367 (citing psychologists who foresee addi-
tional problems for children when grandparents are also involved in custody
litigation). See also supra note 138 (citing psychological studies reaching the
same conclusion).
167. MjNN. STAT. § 257.022(1)-(2); see also supra notes 61-62 (quoting these
provisions).
168. MnN. STAT. § 257.022(2a); see also supra note 69 (quoting this
provision).
169. MIN. H.F. 53, 79th Leg. § 257.022(1); see also supra note 82 (quoting
the proposed standing provision).
170. See supra note 70 (noting that neither the Senate nor the House exten-
sively discussed the cohabitation portion of the bill before passage). Mandating
visitation analogizes grandparents to noncustodial parents. See MimN. STAT.
§ 518.175(1) (1994). The cohabitation provision, however, is not coextensive
with the common law in loco parentis doctrine. See supra note 72 (discussing
the in loco parentis doctrine); supra notes 142-144 (distinguishing the Statute
from the common law). In addition, grandparents do not possess the same legal
responsibility for their grandchild that a parent does. See Victor et al., supra
note 36, at 24 ('There are no state statutes specifically imposing a support obli-
gation on grandparents. . . ."); Bostock, supra note 32, at 359. The analogy
between grandparents and noncustodial parents thus may be inappropriate.
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ply that withholding visitation is more harmful in grandparent
cohabitation situations than in all other situations, including
situations involving cohabitation with non-relatives. 171 The ar-
bitrary right to mandated visitation thus reflects the legisla-
ture's piecemeal approach to legislation in this area and the raw
lobbying power of grandparent groups in Minnesota rather than
a reasoned approach to the theory of grandparent visitation.
D. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN STATUTES
Although incoherent and poorly defined, the Statute gov-
erns standing and the grant of visitation rights. The Statute
does not, however, contain the changed-circumstance safeguards
provided in the corresponding parental visitation statute.172
The Statute, therefore, may not adequately protect parents and
grandchildren from a subsequent change in circumstances.
Unlike the general statute governing visitation rights be-
tween a child and the noncustodial parent,173 the Statute does
not specifically subject grandparent visitation rights to modifica-
tion.174 Although the modification provision in the parental visi-
tation statute directs the court to "modify an order granting or
denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the
best interests of the child,"1 75 the remaining language of that
section implicitly describes only visitation between the child and
noncustodial parent.176 Moreover, the parental visitation stat-
ute does not clearly extend its remedies for failure to comply
with an established visitation schedule to grandparent visita-
tion cases.177 Logically, grandparents should have no greater
legal or moral claim to visit with their grandchildren than simi-
171. The Statute allows courts to exercise discretion in adjudicating the visi-
tation petition of persons other than grandparents who have lived with a child.
See supra note 73 (discussing MmN. STAT. § 257.022(2b)).
172. MINN. STAT. § 518.175. That statute provides remedies for violations of
a visitation order and authorizes courts to modify visitation awards when ap-
propriate. Id. § 518.175(4)-(6).
173. Id.
174. Compare MINN. STAT. § 257.022 with MINN. STAT. § 518.175. Section
518.175(7) incorporates but does not clearly apply the provisions of§ 518.175 to
the grandparent visitation statute.
175. MIN. STAT. § 518.175(5).
176. Section 518.175 is titled "Visitation of children and noncustodial par-
ent." The language of the modification provision refers to "noncustodial parent"
and provides that "[t]he court may ... restrict a parent's visitation rights if
necessary to protect the custodial parent or child from harm." MJN. STAT.
§ 518.175(5) (emphasis added).
177. MnN. STAT. § 518.175(4) (providing a civil contempt remedy for custo-
dial parents who fail to comply with established visitation schedule).
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larly-situated parents.1 -7  The Statute, therefore, should contain
modification and remedial provisions to clarify that such provi-
sions are applicable to grandparent visitation awards.
In. PROPOSING A REVISED MINNESOTA STATUTE
Although the Statute provides broad relief for grandparents
and grandchildren, it contains numerous inconsistencies that
limit its effectiveness in protecting the interests of children sub-
ject to nuclear family disruption. It also inadequately defines
the factors courts should consider in adjudicating grandparent
visitation petitions, creating a disincentive for settlement. Fi-
nally, the Statute lacks changed-circumstance safeguards con-
tained in other visitation statutes to promote equity. To balance
more consciously the competing rights of grandparents, parents,
and grandchildren, this Note proposes a revised Minnesota stat-
ute that eliminates standing distinctions, gives depth to the
standards for adjudicating visitation petitions, and adopts lan-
guage analogizing grandparent visitation to parental visitation.
A. BROADEN AND CLARIFY STANDING REQUIREMENTS
The legislature should revise the Statute to grant equal
standing to both maternal and paternal grandparents.1 79
Although the results of psychological studies are inconclusive,
they show that grandparent visitation benefits grandchildren ir-
respective of the biological relationship between the grandpar-
ent and custodial parent.180
The Statute also should retain an enumeration of the family
court proceedings after which grandparents may petition for vis-
178. See supra note 170 (highlighting the legal distinctions between grand-
parents and parents).
179. The Statute currently grants standing to both maternal and paternal
grandparents following dissolution or cohabitation. See supra notes 117-119
and accompanying text (discussing standing rights under the dissolution and
cohabitation provisions). The Statute should be revised to extend similar rights
to grandparents whose children have died. See supra notes 120-128 and accom-
panying text (recommending that grandparents of the surviving or deceased
parent be allowed to petition for visitation). The proposed amendment being
considered by the 1995 Minnesota Legislature would achieve broadened stand-
ing. MwN. H.F. 53, 79th Leg. § 257.022(1); see also supra note 82 (quoting the
proposed bill).
180. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text (summarizing psycho-
logical studies of the relationship between grandparents and grandchildren).
See also Goffv. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Wyo. 1993) (concluding the relation-
ship between the grandparent and grandchild and its emotional implications
are the same regardless of the marital status of the parent).
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itation because of the benefits of added clarity, despite the draw-
backs of the resulting rigidity.' 8 ' The enumeration approach
also follows the traditional constitutional test for state interven-
tion.182 The legislature should expand the list, however, to in-
clude additional situations where the state constitutionally may
intervene to protect the child.'18
Furthermore, the legislature should narrow the cohabita-
tion provision to align itself with its common-law foundation and
to clearly differentiate between consecutive and non-consecutive
cohabitation. It should require that grandparents prove a custo-
dial relationship before they may petition for visitation. Alter-
natively, to ease the burden of proof, the legislature should
establish a reasonable presumption of custodial status by distin-
guishing situations where grandparents but not parents reside
with grandchildren from situations where the three generations
reside together. 84
Finally, to limit judicial intrusion to those cases where visi-
tation is likely to be in the best interests of the child, the Statute
should require as a prerequisite to standing that the grandpar-
ent and grandchild share an existing beneficial relationship or
that the parent has precluded the formation of such a relation-
ship.' -85 These revisions should eliminate the standing distinc-
tions that confuse courts without eliminating the constitutional
181. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text (arguing that specific
guidelines add needed statutory clarity). The proposed 1995 amendment would
eliminate the existing enumeration. See supra notes 80-82 (summarizing the
amendment).
182. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the constitu-
tional test for state intervention). See also supra notes 131-132 and accompany-
ing text (applying the test in the visitation context).
183. See supra notes 134-141 and accompanying text (analyzing the defi-
ciencies of the Statute's current enumeration).
184. See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text (criticizing the cohabi-
tation provisions deviation from common law). The 24-month period of multi-
generational cohabitation contemplated by the proposed statute mirrors the
time-period contained in the current statutory provision governing visitation by
persons other than grandparents who resided with a child. See infra note 186
(quoting the proposed statute). The length of the cohabitation periods included
in the proposed statute thus follows the existing statutory framework and re-
quires 12 months of cohabitation only where grandparents presumably stand in
a custodial relationship to their grandchild.
185. See supra notes 158-166 and accompanying text (suggesting that per-
sonal contact should be a prerequisite to standing). By allowing a grandparent
who can prove that the parent precluded the formation of a grandparent-
grandchild relationship to petition for visitation, the amendment provides a
remedy for grandparents whose children try to circumvent the proposed rela-
tionship requirement. For a decision applying a corresponding New York provi-
sion, see Agusta v. Carousso, 617 N.Y.S.2d 189, 189-90 (App. Div. 1994).
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safeguards designed to protect parental autonomy and limit
state intervention.'5 6
B. DEFINE THE STANDARDS GOVERNING JuIcIAL
DETERMINATIONS
The Statute should retain the existing standards for judicial
visitation grants: that visitation be in the best interests of the
child and not unreasonably' 8 7 interfere with the parent-child re-
lationship. The Statute should be revised, however, to clarify
the factors courts must consider in making these determina-
186. The revised standing provision might read as follows:
Subd. 1. Standing to Petition for Visitation.
a. A grandparent or great-grandparent of an unmarried minor child
may petition the district or county court for reasonable visitation:
(1) when a parent of the child has died;
(2) after the married parents of the child commence a proceeding
for dissolution, legal separation, or annulment;
(3) with respect to a child born to a mother who was not married to
the child's father when the child was born nor when the child was
conceived, when a parent-child relationship has been established
pursuant to section 257.54 or when the petitioning party can estab-
lish such a relationship;
(4) when the child has resided with the petitioning party(A) for a period of at least twelve consecutive months and the
child's parent(s) was (were) not living in the same household,
or
(B) for a period of at least twenty-four consecutive months and
the child's parent(s) were living in the same household;
(5) when the child is considered a "child in need of protection or
services" pursuant to section 260.015(2a), as defined in section
260.015; or
(6) when a parent of the child has been declared legally incompe-
tent pursuant to section 525.54(2).
The petitioning party must allege and prove the existence of the
relevant situation described above pursuant to which the visitation pe-
tition is brought.
b. For each petition brought pursuant to this section, the petitioning
party must allege and prove an existing relationship with the child, or
must allege and prove that the parent(s) of the child unreasonably pre-
vented the petitioning party from forming such a relationship with the
child.
c. The petitioning party may petition for the rights provided in this
section any time after the occurrence of the event(s) described in (a)
and continuing thereafter during the minority of the child.
187. The Statute only requires that visitation not interfere with the parent-
child relationship. MINN. STAT. § 257.022(1)-(2a); see also supra notes 61, 62, 69
(quoting these provisions). If a visitation dispute proceeds to court, there un-
doubtedly exists some animosity between parent and grandparent which will
have a residual effect on the grandchild. See supra note 76 (discussing the rele-
vant inquiry in Minnesota). Therefore, this Note suggests that the legislature
add the word "unreasonably" to clarify that the interference inherent in court-
ordered visitation itself will be tolerated.
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tions.188 The Statute also should require courts to make de-
tailed findings on each of the factors. 189 Finally, the Statute
should make all visitation awards discretionary. 190 Although
these revisions will not eliminate judicial discretion entirely, the
resulting balance between judicial discretion and predictable re-
sults should analogize grandparent visitation to other areas of
family law.191
188. See supra notes 150-157 and accompanying text (arguing the Statute
should define the judicial standards similar to the way the standards are de-
fined in other custody and visitation statutes). The factors identified in the pro-
posed revision are similar or identical to the "best interests" factors listed in
MIN. STAT. §§ 257.025, 518.17(1). See infra note 191 (quoting the proposed
revision). When possible, this Note proposes identical language to promote con-
sistency in the adjudication of custody and visitation disputes concerning minor
children.
189. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting the corresponding
parental custody and visitation statutes requires that courts make detailed
findings of fact).
190. See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text (criticizing the current
scheme that makes some visitation awards mandatory and others
discretionary).
191. This revised portion of the Statute might read as follows:
Subd. 2. Factors for the Court's Determination.
a. The court may, in its discretion, grant reasonable visitation when:
(1) such visitation is in the best interests of the child; and
(2) such visitation will not unreasonably interfere with the rela-
tionship between the parent(s) and child.
b. In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall con-
sider and evaluate all relevant factors, including:
(1) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to express preference;
(2) the intimacy and duration of the relationship between the peti-
tioning party and the child;(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the peti-
tioning party and any other person with whom the child may have
contact through the petitioning party who may significantly affect
the child's best interests;
(4) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(5) the capacity and disposition of the petitioning party to give the
child love, affection, and guidance;
(6) the likelihood that visitation will promote the child's physical
or mental health and development;
(7) the likelihood that visitation will provide support and stability
for the child after a nuclear family disruption; and
(8) the reasons given by the child's parent(s) for opposing
visitation.
The court must make detailed findings on each of the factors and
explain how the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination
of the best interests of the child.
c. In determining whether visitation will interfere with the relation-
ship between the parent(s) and child, the court shall consider and eval-
uate all relevant factors, including:(1) the quality of the relationship between the petitioning party
and the child's parent(s);
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C. ENU~MRATE STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION, MODIFICATION,
AND ENFORCEMENT OF VISrrATION RIGHTs
The legislature should revise the Statute to subject grand-
parent visitation awards to modification and termination in ap-
propriate circumstances and provide remedies for non-
compliance with its visitation decrees. Although other statutes
may provide for modification or enforcement, the Statute should
contain its own provisions tailored to and clearly governing
grandparent visitation.192 The clarity achieved by duplicating
the modification, termination, and enforcement provisions
within the Statute overrides any disadvantages of
duplication. 193
CONCLUSION
Over the last three decades, dramatic social changes and
the strong "senior lobby" have focused increasing national atten-
tion on the rights of grandparents to visit with their grandchil-
(2) whether the petitioning party is willing and able to encourage
and facilitate a close and continuing relationship between the child
and the child parent(s); and
(3) whether the petitioning party is willing and able to compro-
mise and cooperate in matters involving the child's physical and
emotional health and development.
The court must make detailed findings on each of the factors and
explain how the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination
of whether visitation will interfere with the relationship between the
parent(s) and child.
192. See supra notes 173-178 and accompanying text (analyzing whether
grandparent visitation awards are subject to modification and arguing the Stat-
ute should contain modification provisions similar to parental visitation
statutes).
193. The Statute's revised termination provisions might read as follows:
Subd. 3. Duration of Rights.
a. Visitation rights granted pursuant to this section shall continue for
the minority of the child, unless modified or terminated pursuant to
subsection Wb) of this subdivision.
b. The court shall modify an order granting visitation rights when-
ever modification would serve the best interests of the child, as defined
in subdivision 2.
Subd. 4. Remedies and Sanctions.
a. Proof of an unwarranted denial of or interference with duly estab-
lished visitation may constitute contempt of court.
b. If the court finds that a person has been wrongfully deprived of the
duly established right to visitation, the court shall order the custodial
parent to permit additional visits to compensate for the visitation of
which the person was deprived. Additional visits must be:
(1) of the same type and duration as the wrongfully denied visit;
(2) taken within one year after the wrongfully denied visit; and
(3) at a time acceptable to the person deprived of visitation.
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dren. The Minnesota Legislature responded quickly to
grandparents' appeals for legal relief from the restrictive com-
mon law. The legislative response, however, did not fully ad-
dress the myriad of issues grandparent visitation presents.
This Note proposes a revised Minnesota statute designed to
balance more consciously the competing interests of grandchil-
dren, parents, and grandparents in the legislature's search to
secure the best interests of the child. The revised statute would
eliminate the existing biological relationship barriers to stand-
ing but would limit standing to situations where the state con-
stitutionally may interfere with parental autonomy. The
revised statute would require a pre-existing grandparent-
grandchild relationship to limit standing to situations where the
benefit of visitation arguably would outweigh the detriments of
intra-family litigation. The revised statute also would define the
standards for courts to apply in adjudicating visitation petitions
to ensure more consistent application of the state's police power.
Finally, the revised statute would authorize courts to modify vis-
itation awards in appropriate circumstances and provide a
means for enforcing those awards.
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